A brief discussion of Korry’s future with the Nixon Administration offers a tantalizing, but ultimately inconclusive, hint that Kissinger may have been trying to downplay the extent of his relationship with Korry to the President. Having been informed by Chief of Staff Haldeman that the National Security Advisor was trying to have Korry appointed to a position with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), Nixon denied that Kissinger was “representing” the President’s wishes, “unless Kissinger’s got some goddamn thing that he pulled with him that he’s trying to cover up.”

Haldeman: He [Kissinger] asked for guidance on what your real wishes were on Korry, the, you know, the Ambassador to Chile.

Nixon: Korry’s gone.

Haldeman: Well, he’s gone from Chile, but Kissinger, apparently, is pushing very hard for him to receive some sort of other important appointment, like public affairs officer at HEW, or something like that. And State has fought it. They said that they won’t give him any other post. They just don’t want him around. And—

Nixon: What in the name of God, you know?

Haldeman: Sir, we—Pete [Flanigan] just wondered if Kissinger was representing your wishes in this, or whether it was some—

Nixon: No, unless Kissinger has got some goddamn thing that he pulled with him [Korry] that he’s trying to cover up.

Haldeman: Well, it may be—

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1 Kissinger argued that the 40 Committee that he chaired as National Security Advisor (and which “authorized but did not supervise” U.S. covert actions) had abandoned any attempt to precipitate a coup d’état (Track Two) nine days prior to the run-off vote in the Chilean Congress on October 24, 1971 that would certify Allende’s victory once it became clear that neither the Christian Democratic Party nor the Chilean military had either the means or the inclination to block Allende. *White House Years*, 653-683.
Nixon: The other thing, of course, is, you know what this is, don’t you?

[Unclear exchange]

Haldeman: There may be more to it than that, because Buckley, Bill Buckley—

Nixon: Is pushing it, too [unclear]—

Haldeman: [Unclear]—

Nixon: Well, he [Korry] is a capable man. He’s erratic and all that sort of thing, but—

Haldeman: He’s not ours, though. He’s a newsman—

Nixon: Hell, no, he was—

Haldeman: —who was appointed by Kennedy—

Nixon: He was a Look [Magazine] editor, went with Stevenson places.3

Haldeman: Hmm. So, what your feeling is on Buckley is: Reappoint him to the USIA advisory board? His having been openly opposed to us, there’s a question of whether it’s—makes any sense to put him back on.

[...]

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Haldeman: Henry may want—There may be something, if they were trying to do things—

Nixon: In a little way. No.

Haldeman: Should I ask Henry?

Nixon: Yeah. Tell him, “Henry, how do you really feel about this? Is this a post [unclear]?” We say, “If he [Korry] wants to be a convert, let him be a convert.” He has an influence in a certain liberal area, where we have no influence in. You see my point? He’s an eclectic. [Unclear].

Haldeman: We sure as hell don’t want him as a PAO [public affairs officer] at HEW.

Nixon: No. God, no!

Haldeman: There, you’ve got to have a solid—

Nixon: A solid, solid conservative.

Haldeman: Conservative. Or, at least, a guy that we can control.

[...]


3 Korry had served as the European editor of Look Magazine from 1954-1960, while Adlai Stevenson II (Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations, 1961-1965) was a frequent contributor to Look during the 1950s.