Apart from continuing the vent his frustrations over State’s duplicity concerning the upcoming “Paris Club” meeting, Nixon reaffirmed his desire “to give Allende the hook.” He also noted that Bill Rogers’ position on expropriation seemed to have moved closer to Connally’s, which had not been the case seven months before, during the June 1971 meeting on the Sequoia (the records of which have yet to be declassified).

[...]

650-013_Clip1 (2.2m; 2:16)

Nixon: We had a [clears throat] a very interesting thing when I—just a small thing, but not what Connally and I discussed. You remember—You remember the thing he wrote?

Haldeman: Yes.

Nixon: Telling me about the Chilean thing?

Haldeman: Yes.

Nixon: But, Bob, either Bill [Rogers] didn’t know about what was going on in his department, or he deliberately was lying. His department has screwed a policy that I had laid down. Now, everybody around here knows that I want to give Allende the hook, and that I’m against expropriation, or [business with Chile]—

Haldeman: This guy, Weintraub is, is—

Nixon: Yeah. All right, because—

Haldeman: Rogers, though is not—

Nixon: —my point is—

Haldeman: —not—at least, he didn’t use to be with Connally, at least, and I don’t think with you on the expropriation viewpoint.

Nixon: Who?

Haldeman: Rogers.

Nixon: I know that.
Haldeman: He argued that very strongly that night on the Sequoia.¹

Nixon: I know. I know he did. Yes, that’s right, but, nevertheless, that’s my view, and that’s the way it’s going to be. The point that I make is that we have a situation here where, where—So I got him and [unclear] Connally’s memo to me.² I said—I asked Alex [Haig] this morning. I said, “Where is it?” I said, “It came Saturday.”

Haldeman: It was over at the NSC.

Nixon: He said it was in the NSC being staffed. I said, “Get it in.” Goddamnit, I was going to meet with Connally Monday, and you know damn well he was going to ask me about it. So, they brought it and nothing had been done, of course. You know, piled up with all the other things. So I answered it myself, sent a memorandum to Connally, and a copy to Rogers, and, naturally, a blind copy to Kissinger, simply saying that Connally is to be in charge of the delegation.³ But, Bob, on that point, I mean, Bill or State had no business where it’s the renegotiation of a loan, of having a State Department asshole go over to Paris and renegotiate. He knows damn well that this has to be done at the Connally-level. Would you not agree, or not?

Haldeman: Yeah.

Nixon: It’s a Treasury problem.

Haldeman: I can’t imagine that he’d—

Nixon: Yeah?

Haldeman: —would not know, and I just think—I would suspect that maybe it’s something Bill just doesn’t know, you know, that it’s happening.

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
[National Security]
[Duration:12s]
[Subject: Intelligence]
END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
[...]

¹ June 10, 1971.
³ NSDM 148.
Nixon: You know, Bob, did—were you—weren’t you told I wanted Connally to focus on that, on that damn Chilean loan thing that I put the wording—?

Haldeman: Yes. Yes.

Nixon: And we—’cause he wasn’t coloring it a bit. He read—

Haldeman: That’s right.

Nixon: —from that document.

Haldeman: Yeah.

Nixon: That document scared our Ambassador to apologize, because of his Christmas holidays were not—

Haldeman: Well, even worse: [that] it was lucky that he had—

Nixon: Yeah.

Haldeman: —had gotten the request—he had gotten the request approved before some other action was taken, because that wouldn’t have—it would have [unclear]—

Nixon: Yeah. Let me say that the reason that I’m so—I wanted to hit it if Henry raises the point off of his desk, is that it would give him a real bludgeon, in which case Rogers doesn’t know—

Haldeman: Yeah.

Nixon: —because he knows how I feel about Chile.

Haldeman: Yeah.

Nixon: And Rogers should not have let this happen, so I’ve just done it in my own—actually, because Connally came in.

[...]